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Abstract. In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining
procedure, the equilibria of which converge to Lindahl allocations as the cost of
bargaining vanishes. The procedure splits the decision over the allocation in a
decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the public
good. Since this procedure does not assume price-taking behavior, it provides a
strategic foundation for the personalized taxes inherent in the Lindahl solution to
the public goods problem.
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1. Introduction
The private provision of public goods in general leads to ineﬃcient allocations in a
competitive market environment. This ineﬃciency is often attributed to a missing
market. If personalized markets could be created that individually price the public
good for each agent, then a competitive equilibrium could implement an eﬃcient
allocation. For an economy with public goods, this outcome is known as a Lindahl
equilibrium. Typically, however, a Lindahl equilibrium is deemed unrealistic be-
cause of a serious shortcoming: in the personalized markets upon which it rests the
agents are assumed to be price-takers. Unfortunately, by the personalized nature of
those markets, there is only one single agent on the demand side in each of them,
which makes price-taking behavior of this single agent an utterly unrealistic as-
sumption. In contrast, in this paper we propose a bargaining procedure that leads
to an outcome arbitrarily close to a Lindahl allocation as the cost of bargaining
vanishes, without the need of assuming price-taking behavior. As a matter of fact,
the agents in our model have quite a lot of market power.
In the case of a missing market, as is the case in the presence of a public good,
one way to allocate the surplus left unappropriated is through Coasian bargaining.
As pointed out by Coase, as long as there remain gains from trade the parties
involved have incentives to get together and strike a deal. The main feature of such
bargaining is that it is decentralized (no benevolent government must intervene),
and the extent to which the surplus can be allocated to the parties depends on the
details of the bargaining protocol and on whether the bargaining is costly or not.
The study of this type of bargaining in legislatures has already been addressed in
Baron and Ferejohn (1989), where a model is presented in which one of the diﬀerent
possible ways to divide a given pie is chosen by a vote according to the majority rule.
It turns out that typically there exist many equilibria for this procedure. Banks and
Duggan (2000) present a far more general model in which the space of alternatives
is a compact, convex subset of a multidimensional Euclidean space. They consider
arbitrary voting rules and prove the existence of stationary equilibria, the upper
hemicontinuity of equilibrium proposals in structural and preference parameters,
and a core equivalence result. While several of these bargaining set-ups encompass
economies with public goods, they diﬀer from our own set-up in that ours implicitly
imposes constraints on what the proposer is able to oﬀer to other agents. We believe
these constraints reflect in a natural way the sharing of power in a bargaining
Typeset by AMS-TEX
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situation over both the output level and the financing of a public good. As a
consequence of imposing such constraints on the oﬀers, the bargaining protocol
considered here attains in the limit the outcome that would result from completing
the missing markets. This holds without resorting to the heroic assumption of
price-taking behavior with respect to personalized prices.
Specifically, we model the collective decision making process with respect to the
provision of public goods as a sequential bargaining game. The sequential nature
of the game reflects a realistic feature of the power of setting the agenda of the
negotiation. The proposal and acceptance decisions are endogenous. Agents can
reject a proposal and have it modified in their turn. Because of the cost of any delay
in reaching an agreement, the bargaining outcome will in general be ineﬃcient, thus
reflecting the power of setting the agenda: when there is impatience for reaching an
agreement, the agent who makes an oﬀer that is accepted will extract more rents
at the cost of ineﬃciency. As the impatience or cost of a delay vanishes, those rents
disappear and the allocation is eﬃcient and independent of who had the power of
setting the agenda.
We show that, despite the fact that output decisions for public goods and their
mode of financing are often the result of a political process rife with opportunities
for strategic behavior, the Lindahl allocations can be implemented without assuming
price-taking behavior with respect to personalized prices. This is obtained precisely
through strategic bargaining by the parties over the financing of the public good.1
In order to show this we take here a first step towards modelling the political process
behind output and financing decisions with regard to public goods as a sequential
bargaining game of complete information.
We consider an economy with any finite number of public goods and private goods
(not necessarily the same number of each). There are two agents in this economy
who take turns alternatingly (as in Rubinstein (1982)) to propose a maximum level
of provision of each of the public goods and a way to split between them the cost of
financing any level of the public goods to be provided up to the proposed maxima
(this amounts to proposing personalized prices or taxes). The other agent can then
1The mixed competitive mechanisms proposed in Groves and Ledyard (1977) obviously can eﬃ-
ciently allocate private and public goods to coincide with the Lindahl allocation. However, those
direct mechanisms both rely on a centralized mechanism designer and they may involve compli-
cated mechanisms. The virtue here is that an eﬃcient allocation of private and public goods is
obtained through a decentralized bargaining procedure. It is simple: it relies explicitly on person-
alized contributions (taxes) and incorporates the notion that agenda setters have power to extract
more rents when bargaining is costly.
2
either accept or reject the proposal. In case of acceptance, this other agent chooses
the amount of each public good to be provided (subject to the maximum amount
oﬀered in the proposal). Each agent pays for the public goods according to the
personalized prices agreed upon. The levels of public goods and their financing are
fixed thereafter so the game is eﬀectively over. If instead the other agent rejects the
proposal, then it is his turn to make a proposal himself of a new maximum amounts
and personalized prices, and so on.
Within this set-up we show that, as the discount factors of each agent in the econ-
omy converge to one, the allocation of any stationary subgame perfect equilibrium
converges to a Lindahl equilibrium allocation. In particular, we show first that, for
infinitely patient agents (i.e., for discount factors equal to 1), the set of Lindahl allo-
cations coincides with the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium allocations
of the alternating-oﬀer bargaining game described above. Then we establish the
upper hemicontinuity of the correspondence mapping, to each pair of discount fac-
tors, the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium allocations of the bargaining
game, and in particular its upper hemicontinuity for discount factors δA = δB = 1.
The conclusion then follows from these two results.
In this simple set-up, unanimity plays an important role in our modeling. In eﬀect,
a tax proposal can be adopted only if it is acceptable to every agent. This has the
virtue of conferring a Wicksellian character to the Lindahl solution to the public
goods problem. In a classical contribution to the theory of public finance, Wicksell
(1896) proposed unanimity as the criterion for just taxation. The game we propose
incorporates the need for achieving consensus to eﬀect tax proposals that to some
extent may characterize budgetary procedures in political regimes with multiple
checks and balances or in parliamentary democracies without a majority party.
Ineﬃciencies associated with bargaining are shown to disappear as agents become
increasingly patient. Thus, a Wicksellian procedure turns out to be consistent with
a Lindahl result. Of course, this result depends on the assumption of complete
information.
The results of this paper parallel results obtained in Da´vila and Eeckhout (2008)
for economies without public goods. In that paper the authors provide a bargain-
ing foundation for Walrasian equilibria in a two-agent exchange economy in which
agents are not price-takers. The strategy of the proofs here is similar, although the
presence of public goods in co-existence with private goods introduces significant
technical diﬀerences for the proofs provided in Da´vila and Eeckhout (2008) not to
go through straightforwardly. In particular, the public goods problem augments the
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private goods problem in two ways. First, in the private goods economy, all prices
are common across agents and consumptions for each good are agent specific. In the
public goods economy we add to the previous setup prices that are agent specific
for each public good, while the consumption of each public good is common across
agents. Second, the presence of public goods naturally introduces production in the
economy. In this sense the results provided here do not follow as a corollary from
those in Da´vila and Eeckhout (2008).
More importantly, we think that looking for a bargaining foundation for the Lindahl
equilibrium is an even more natural question to address given that the decision about
the provision of public goods typically takes place within legislatures. From this
perspective, we think that the proposed setup captures well the problem faced by
two parties with known preferences that try to reach an agreement on the provision
of some public goods. Moreover, this bargaining foundation addresses one of the
main critiques of the Lindahl equilibrium notion, namely the inevitable market
power that the asumption of personalized markets for the public goods entails. We
discuss possible extensions of our results in the final remarks.
2. The model
We consider a public good economy consisting of two agents A and B, and an ar-
bitrary number n + m of goods: n private goods x1, . . . , xn and m public goods
y1, . . . , ym. The agents are infinitely lived and time is discrete. For each agent
i = A,B, let xi ∈ Rn+ be i’s consumption of private goods, and let y ∈ Rm+ be their
common consumption of public goods. The agents have preferences over the two
types of goods represented by standard utility functions uA(xA, y) and uB(xB , y),
that is to say non-negative, C2, monotone, diﬀerentiably strictly quasi-concave,2
and well-behaved at the boundary of Rn+m+ .3 This good behavior at the bound-
ary guarantees the possibility of generating a surplus by the production of public
goods, i.e. at a Lindahl equilibrium necessarily y > 0. The agents are endowed
with amounts ei (with total endowment e = eA + eB) of the private goods. As a
normalization, we assume the initial amount of the public goods is zero. A linear
technology M ∈ Rn×m allows to produce each public good yj by means of the
private goods, requiring mij units of private good xi for each unit of yj , for all
2That is to say, for all i = A,B, for all (x, y) ∈ Rn+m++ , D2ui(x, y) is negative definite in the space
orthogonal to Dui(x, y).
3That is to say, for all i = A,B, and all xj , yk, it holds true that limxh→0Dxhui(x, y) =∞, and
limyk→0Dykui(x, y) =∞.
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i = 1, . . . , n.
We consider an alternating-oﬀers bargaining game. In any given period prior to an
agreement, an agent i makes an oﬀer consisting of a vector pi = (pxi, pyi) of prices
for the other agent (in terms of, say, the private good x1) and an upper bound qi
on the other agent’s contribution of private goods to the provision of public goods
or, equivalently, to the provision of public goods itself. After receiving an oﬀer the
other agent can either accept it or reject it. In case of acceptance, the accepting
agent chooses his consumption of private goods and the quantities of public goods
to be provided subject to the accepted prices pi and upper bound on trades qi.
This procedure is repeated until a proposal is accepted. The utility of each agent
i is discounted in each iteration by a positive discount factor δi not bigger than 1.
The utility of never reaching an agreement is 0.
3. The stationary subgame perfect (SSP) equilibrium allocations
We consider first the stationary subgame perfect equilibria without delay of the
bargaining game, that is the SSP equilibria in which no agent has incentives to
reject the oﬀer received. Indeed, as argued in Section 6 below, there does not
exist any SSP equilibrium with delay if the agents are impatient, that is to say if
δA, δB < 1.
The SSP equilibria with no delay are characterized by a pair of oﬀers (pA, qA)
and (pB , qB), consisting each of a vector of prices and a maximum amount for
the contributions of private goods, such that (pA, qA) maximizes the utility that A
obtains from B’s immediate acceptance, subject to the constraint that it is indeed
in B’s interest to accept A’s oﬀer, and similarly for (pB , qB).
Formally, (pA, qA) solves
maxuA(eA − x˜B(pA, qA)−My˜B(pA, qA), y˜B(pA, qA)) (2)
subject to the constraint
uB(x˜B(pA, qA),y˜B(pA, qA)) ≥
δBuB(eB − x˜A(pB , qB)−My˜A(pB , qB), y˜A(pB , qB)),
(3)
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where x˜B(pA, qA), y˜B(pA, qA) is the solution to
maxuB(x, y)
pA · (x− eB , y) ≤ 0
￿(x− eB , y)￿ ≤ qA,
(4)
where ￿ · ￿ stands for the Euclidean norm,4 and symmetrically for (pB , qB).
Note that a SSP equilibrium without delay can equivalently be characterized by the
allocations eﬀectively oﬀered by the agents. In eﬀect, we establish in Lemma 1 in
the Appendix that, conditional on immediate acceptance, an oﬀer by A of (pA, qA)
amounts to oﬀering B the bundle (x˜B(pA, qA), y˜B(pA, qA)), which is characterized
by satisfying the condition
(uBx (x
B , y), uBy (x
B , y))
￿
xB − eB
y
￿
≥ 0. (5)
Conversely, any bundle (xB , y) satisfying the previous inequality is a solution to
B’s problem above for some oﬀer (pA, yA) by A.
As a consequence, a SSP equilibrium without delay can also be characterized by
allocations (xAA, xBA , yA) and (xAB , xBB , yB), proposed by A and B respectively, such
that (xAA, xBA , yA) solves
maxuA(xA, y)
(uBx (x
B , y), uBy (x
B , y))
￿
xB − eB
y
￿
≥ 0
uB(xB , y) ≥ δBuB(xBB , yB)
xA + xB +My = eA + eB
(6)
given (xAB , xBB , yB), and (xAB , xBB , yB) solves
maxuB(xB , y)
(uAx (x
A, y), uAy (x
A, y))
￿
xA − eA
y
￿
≥ 0
uA(xA, y) ≥ δAuA(xAA, yA)
xA + xB +My = eA + eB
(7)
4This choice is done for analytical convenience. As a matter of fact, being in a finite-dimension
vector space, all norms are equivalent, so that the choice of the norm in equation (4) is inessential.
6
given (xAA, xBA , yA).
At this point, it may be worth to clarify the main diﬀerence between Rubinstein’s
setup and ours. Note that in choosing their oﬀers the agents are constrained not
only to guarantee each other the continuation value at each stage, but also that
this value is computed only for prices and quotas that are subgame perfect. A
consequence of introducing this additional constraint is that, when the agents are
impatient, there may remain surplus still to be distributed at a SSP equilibrium.
In Rubinstein’s setup this is ruled out since there, all the feasible utility profiles
are available for negotiation. Here the utility profiles available are constrained to
be those attainable as SSP equilibrium outcomes of bargaining over prices and
maximum provisions of public goods. In fact, without constraint (5) in problem (6)
and the analogous constraint in problem (7), each proposal would be Pareto eﬃcient
like in Rubinstein. In Section 6 below we show that such ineﬃciency vanishes as
the agents become arbitrarily patient.
4. The Lindahl allocations
A Lindahl equilibrium consists of a vector of private good prices px, a vector of
personalized prices for the public goods pAy , pBy , and an allocation (xA, xB , y) such
that
(1) the allocation is feasible, i.e. xA, xB , y ≥ 0 and
xA + xB +My = eA + eB .
(2) each agent’s consumption (xi, y), i = A,B, maximizes his utility given px
and piy, i.e.
(uix(x
i, y), uiy(x
i, y)) = λi(px, piy)
px(xi − ei) + piyy = 0
for some λi > 0.
(3) the production of public goods maximizes profits, which implies, when y ￿
0,5
pAy + p
B
y − pxM = 0.
5The production of an amount 0 for some public good cannot be an equilibrium outcome given
that the utility functions behavior at the boundary guarantees interior solutions for positive prices.
7
Therefore, a Lindahl equilibrium allocation (xA, xB , y) is a feasible allocation such
that uAx (xA, y) and uBx (xB , y) are colinear, and it allocates to each agent i = A,B his
demand (xi, y) at his personalized relative prices, implicitly equal to the marginal
rates of substitution determined by his marginal utilities at (xi, y), i.e.
(uix(x
i, y), uiy(x
i, y))
￿
xi − ei
y
￿
= 0. (8)
For the case of one private good and one public good produced with a 1-unit linear
technology, Lindahl equilibrium allocations can be represented in a Kolm triangle,
the public goods equivalent of the Edgeworth box of a private goods exchange
economy (see Figure 1 below; Thomson (1999) provides a useful presentation and
discussion of the Kolm triangle). The Kolm triangle assumes a linear production
technology requiring one unit of the private good for each unit of the public good.
The height of the triangle represents the initial total endowment of the private
good. The orthogonal distance from any point within the triangle to each of its
sides represents each agent’s allocation of the private good (xA and xB), while the
vertical distance to the base of the triangle represents their common consumption
y of the public good. Thus, at the initial endowment (eA, eB) there is no provision
of the public good.
Figure 1
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The personalized prices pA and pB represent the terms of exchange of one unit of
public good for pA units of the private good from agent A and pB units of private
8
good from agent B. A balanced budget where the total contributions equal the
total cost of production of the public good implies that for all y,
￿I
i=1 p
iy = y. For
a given price schedule p, the oﬀer curve OCi gives the optimal amount of public
good and private good demanded by agent i at those terms of trade. An intersection
of the oﬀer curves represents then optimal quantities of the public good and the
private good consumed by the agents given a vector of personalized prices that
balances the budget. This corresponds to a Lindahl equilibrium allocation. There
are of course other eﬃcient allocation represented by the Pareto set P , but they
are not attainable by means of price schedules starting from the initial endowment
(eA, eB).
5. SSP equilibrium allocations are
Lindahl allocations when δA = δB = 1
First we show that for infinitely patient agents, that is, when the discount factors
δA and δB are 1, the Lindahl equilibrium allocations, and only these allocations,
are oﬀered at a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game
above. For discount factors equal to one the only SSP equilibrium allocation is
the Lindahl allocation. This is quite remarkable and in sharp contrast with the
standard Rubinstein bargaining equilibrium, where the entire Pareto frontier is an
equilibrium when there is no discounting.
Theorem 1. When δA = δB = 1, at every SSP equilibrium with immediate ac-
ceptance the agents’ oﬀers lead to the same allocation. Moreover, this allocation is
a Lindahl equilibrium allocation. Conversely, every Lindahl equilibrium allocation
is the allocation oﬀered by the two agents at some SSP equilibrium without delay.
Proof. Let (xAA, xBA , yA) and (xAB , xBB , yB) be the feasible allocations resulting from
B’s (resp. A’s) acceptance of A’s (resp. B’s) oﬀer of price and maximum provi-
sions of public goods at a SSP equilibrium with immediate acceptance for infinitely
patient players. That is, let (xAA, xBA , yA) and (xAB , xBB , yB) be such that
9
(xAA, x
B
A , yA) ∈ arg max
xA,xB ,y
uA(xA, y)
(uBx (x
B , y), uBy (x
B , y))
￿
xB − eB
y
￿
≥ 0
uB(xB , y) ≥ uB(xBB , yB)
xA + xB +My = eA + eB
given (xAB , x
B
B , yB),
(9)
and
(xAB , x
B
B , yB) ∈ arg max
xA,xB ,y
uB(xB , y)
(uAx (x
A, y), uAy (x
A, y))
￿
xA − eA
y
￿
≥ 0
uA(xA, y) ≥ uA(xA, y)
xA + xB +My = eA + eB
given (xAA, x
B
A , yA).
(10)
Then, from the from the first-order conditions, there exist multipliers λA, µA, λB ,
µB ≥ 0 and νA, νB such thatuAx (xAA, yA)0
uAy (xAA, yA)
+ λA
 0uBx (xBA , yA)
uBy (xBA , yA)

+ µA
 0uBx (xBA , yA) + uBxx(xBA , yA)(xBA − eB) + uByx(xBA , yA)yA
uBy (xBA , yA) + uBxy(xBA , yA)(xBA − eB) + uByy(xBA , yA)yA

+
n￿
i=1
νAi
 eiei
mti·
 = 0,
(11)
where mti· is the i-th row of M transposed as a column. Equivalently, eliminating
the multipliers νAi ,￿
uAx (xAA, yA)
M tuAx (xAA, yA)− uAy (xAA, yA)
￿
= λA
￿
uBx (xBA , yA)
uBy (xBA , yA)
￿
+ µA
￿
uBx (xBA , yA) + uBxx(xBA , yA) (xBA − eB) + uByx(xBA , yA) yA
uBy (xBA , yA) + uBxy(xBA , yA) (xBA − eB) + uByy(xBA , yA) yA
￿
,
(12)
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and similarly￿
uBx (xBB , yB)
M tuBx (xBB , yB)− uBy (xBB , yB)
￿
= λB
￿
uAx (xAB , yB)
uAy (xAB , yB)
￿
+ µB
￿
uAx (xAB , yB) + uAxx(xAB , yB)(xAB − eA) + uAyx(xAB , yB)yB
uAy (xAB , yB) + uAxy(xAB , yB)(xAB − eA) + uAyy(xAB , yB)yB
￿
.
(13)
Assume that (xAA, xBA , yA) ￿= (xAB , xBB , yB). Since at a SSP equilibrium with δA =
δB = 1 the constraints
uA(xAB , yB) ≥ uA(xAA, yA)
uB(xBA , yA) ≥ uB(xBB , yB)
(14)
are binding,6 and hence both allocations are on the same indiﬀerence surface for
both agents,7 then none of these two allocations can be eﬃcient while being diﬀerent.
Therefore the eﬃciency condition that￿
uAx (xA, y)
uAy (xA, y)
￿
and
￿
uBx (xB , y)
M tuBx (xB , y)− uBy (xB , y)
￿
(15)
are collinear cannot hold neither at (xAA, xBA , yA) nor at (xAB , xBB , yB). In particular,
there exist h, k such that
uAyk(x
A
B , yB)
uAxh(x
A
B , yB)
￿=
￿n
i=1miku
B
xi(x
B
B , yB)− uByk(xBB , yB)
uBxh(x
B
B , yB)
.
Suppose
uAyk(x
A
B , yB)
uAxh(x
A
B , yB)
<
￿n
i=1miku
B
xi(x
B
B , yB)− uByk(xBB , yB)
uBxh(x
B
B , yB)
. (16)
We claim that if (16) holds, then equation (13) cannot be satisfied for non-negative
multipliers. (A similar argument shows that if the inequality is reversed, then
equation (12) cannot be satisfied for nonnegative multipliers.)
6For instance, since (xAA, x
B
A , yA) satisfies Du
A(xA, y)(xA − eA, y) ≥ 0 (agent A will never choose
at equilibrium to let B ask for a provision of public goods bigger than the one necessary to attain
A’s demand at the implicit prices), then uB(xBA , yA) ≤ uB(xBB , yB) holds as well.
7For this step to hold true it is crucial that δA = δB = 1.
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In eﬀect, since (λB , µB) must solve (13) above, then it must also solve￿
uBxh(x
B
B , yB)￿n
i=1miku
B
xi(x
B
B , yB)− uByk(xBB , yB)
￿
= λB
￿
uAxh(x
A
B , yB)
uAyk(x
A
B , yB)
￿
+ µB
￿
uAxh(x
A
B , yB) + uAxhxh(x
A
B , yB)(xAB − eA) + uAykxh(xAB , yB)yB
uAyk(x
A
B , yB) + uAxhyk(x
A
B , yB)(xAB − eA) + uAykyk(xAB , yB)yB
￿
.
(17)
In particular, µB is equal to￿￿￿￿uAxh(xAB , yB) uBxh(xBB , yB)uAyk(xAB , yB) ￿ni=1mikuBxi(xBB , yB)− uByk(xBB , yB)
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿uAxh(xAB , yB) uAxh(xAB , yB) + uAxhxh(xAB , yB)(xAB − eA) + uAykxh(xAB , yB)yBuAyk(xAB , yB) uAyk(xAB , yB) + uAxhyk(xAB , yB)(xAB − eA) + uAykyk(xAB , yB)yB
￿￿￿￿ . (18)
Since µB ≥ 0, and the numerator is strictly positive according to (16), so must be
the denominator. But the denominator is equivalent to
(−uAyk(xAB , yB) uAxh(xAB , yB) )
·
￿￿
uAxh(x
A
B , yB)
uAyk(x
A
B , yB)
￿
+
￿
uAxhxh(x
A
B , yB) uAxhyk(x
A
B , yB)
uAykxh(x
A
B , yB) uAykyk(x
A
B , yB)
￿￿
xAhB − eAh
ykB
￿￿
,
(19)
which is negative since the first scalar product is null and the Hessian of uA at
(xAB , yB) is semi-definite negative in the space orthogonal to the gradient of uA at
(xAB , yB) and hence also to any (0, . . . , 0, xAhB−eAh , 0, . . . , 0, ykB , 0, . . . , 0) orthogonal
to (uAx (xAB , yB), uAy (xAB , yB)), i.e. for all (xAhB − eAh , ykB) such that
uAxh(x
A
B , yB) (x
A
hB − eAh ) + uAyk(xAB , yB) yAkB = 0. (20)
(Note that in this case (−uAyk(xAB , yB), uAxh(xAB , yB)) is collinear to (xAhB − eAh , ykB)
up to a positive constant.) It follows that if δA = δB = 1 then at a SSP equilibrium
with immediate acceptance the two agents oﬀer the same allocation.
Let xA, xB , y be the common allocation oﬀered at a SSP equilibrium when δA =
δB = 1. This allocation is therefore such that uAx (xA, y) and uBx (xB , y) are collinear,
it is interior, in particular y ￿ 0, given the boundary behavior of the utility func-
tions ui, and
xA + xB +My = eA + eB , (21)
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(xA, y) ∈ argmaxuB(e− xˆA −Myˆ, yˆ)
(uAx (xˆ
A, yˆ), uAy (xˆ
A, yˆ))
￿
xˆA − eA
yˆ
￿
≥ 0
uA(xˆA, yˆ) ≥ uA(e− xB −My, y)
given xB , y,
(22)
and
(xB , y) ∈ argmaxuA(e− xˆB −Myˆ, yˆ)
(uBx (xˆ
B , yˆ), uBy (xˆ
B , yˆ))
￿
xˆB − eB
yˆ
￿
≥ 0
uB(xˆB , yˆ) ≥ uB(e− xA −My, y)
given xA, y.
(23)
In eﬀect, since δA = δB = 1, should uAx (xA, y) and uBx (xB , y) not be collinear,
then there would remain enough gains from trade to be exploited for any of the
two agents to deviate making a Pareto-improving oﬀer that the other agent would
accept, contradicting that it is a SSP equilibrium alocation. Suppose also that
(uAx (x
A, y), uAy (x
A, y))
￿
xA − eA
y
￿
> 0. (24)
Then, since both uA and uB are concave,
(xA, y) ∈ argmaxuB(e− xˆA −Myˆ, yˆ)
uA(xˆA, yˆ) ≥ uA(e− xB −My, y)
given xB , y.
(25)
Therefore, there exists λ > 0 such that￿
uAx (xA, y)
uAy (xA, y)
￿
= λ
￿
uBx (xB , y)
M tuBx (xB , y)− uBy (xB , y)
￿
= λ
￿
In 0
M t −Im
￿￿
uBx (xB , y)
uBy (xB , y)
￿
,
or equivalently,
(uAx (x
A, y), uAy (x
A, y)) = λ(uBx (x
B , y), uBy (x
B , y))
￿
In M
0 −Im
￿
. (26)
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But from equations (21), (24) and (26) we get
(uBx (x
B , y), uBy (x
B , y))
￿
xB − eB
y
￿
< 0,
which contradicts equation (4) above. Therefore
(uAx (x
A, y), uAy (x
A, y))
￿
xA − eA
y
￿
= 0 (27)
and similarly
(uBx (x
B , y), uBy (x
B , y))
￿
xB − eB
y
￿
= 0. (28)
That is, the allocation proposed by both agents at a SSP equilibrium is on both
agents’ oﬀer curves and such that uAx (xA, y) and uBx (xB , y) are collinear and, so
that it is a Lindahl equilibrium allocation.8
Conversely, let xA, xB , y be the allocation of a Lindahl equilibrium, i.e. an allocation
such that
xA + xB +My = eA + eB , (29)
(uAx (x
A, y), uAy (x
A, y))
￿
xA − eA
y
￿
= 0, (30)
and
(uBx (x
B , y), uBy (x
B , y))
￿
xB − eB
y
￿
= 0. (31)
Let
(pA, qA) = ((uBx (x
B , y), uBy (x
B , y)), y)
and
(pB , qB) = ((uAx (x
A, y), uAy (x
A, y)), y),
8The additional condition for it to be a Lindahl equilibrium allocation, namely that pAy + p
B
y −
pxM = 0, follows from the satisfaction of the budget constraints (with the prices px = uAx (x
A, y),
pAy = u
A
y (x
A, y), and pBy = µu
B
y (x
B , y), µ > 0 being the scalar for which uAx (x
A, y) = µuBx (x
B , y)
given their colinearity) and the fact that y ￿ 0.
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so that xA = x˜A(pB , qB), xB = x˜B(pA, qA) and y˜A(pB , qB) = y = y˜B(pA, qA). It
can be easily checked that the Lindahl allocation (xA, xB , y) is the outcome of the
following SSP equilibrium profile of strategies:
(1) A oﬀers (pA, qA) whenever he has the opportunity to do so, and accepts only
oﬀers (p, q) such that
uA(x˜A(p, q), y˜A(p, q)) ≥ δAuA(x˜A(pB , qB), y˜A(pB , qB))
(2) B oﬀers (pB , qB) whenever he has the opportunity to do so, and accepts
only oﬀers (p, q) such that
uB(x˜B(p, q), y˜B(p, q)) ≥ δBuB(x˜B(pA, qA), y˜B(pA, qA)).
Q.E.D.
6. Convergence of SSP equilibrium allocations
to Lindahl allocations as δA, δB → 1
In the relevant case in which bargaining entails some frictions, so that the factors
by which the agents discount future utilities are strictly smaller than 1, any SSP
equilibrium allocation is still arbitrarily close to a Lindahl allocation if agents are
patient enough. This is a consequence of the fact that the correspondence of SSP
equilibrium allocations is upper hemicontinuous with respect to the agents’ discount
factors, as Theorem 2 next establishes. In the proof it suﬃces to consider only SSP
equilibria in which the first oﬀer gets accepted immediately, since there does not
exist any SSP equilibrium with delay whenever δA, δB < 1.9
Theorem 2. Every SSP equilibrium allocation converges to a Lindahl allocation
as δA, δB → 1.
9Consider a candidate SSP equilibrium (pA, qA) and (pB , qB) in which, for instance, B rejects and
A accepts. Let (xAB , x
B
B , yB) be the feasible allocation resulting from A’s acceptance of B’s oﬀer
of price and maximum provisions of public goods. Suppose that (xAB , x
B
B , yB) is eﬃcient. Then
A could deviate oﬀering himself B’s oﬀer instead, since A will accept it anyway later, saving the
cost of delay in reaching an agreement. Since (xAB , x
B
B , yB) is eﬃcient, there is a price vector such
that if oﬀered this price and a nonbinding quota, B would choose this allocation. Suppose that
(xAB , x
B
B , yB) is ineﬃcient. Then there is room for A deviating and making an oﬀer that is eﬃcient
and Pareto improving with respect to (xAB , x
B
B , yB) and that B would accept.
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Proof. Given that there is no SSP equilibrium with delay if δA, δB < 1, it is suﬃ-
cient to show the upper hemicontinuity of the correspondence of allocations of SSP
equilibria with immediate acceptance.
Consider then the correspondence Φ defined as
Φ(xAA, x
B
A , yA, x
A
B , x
B
B , yB ; δ
A, δB) =
arg max
0≤xA,xB ,y
uA(xA, y)× arg max
0≤xA,xB ,y
uB(xB , y)
DuB(xB ,y)
 
xB−eB
y
!
≥0 DuA(xA,y)
 
xA−eA
y
!
≥0
uB(xB ,y)≤δBuB(xBB ,yB) uA(xA,y)≥δAuA(xAA,yA)
xA+xB+My=eA+eB xA+xB+My=eA+eB
given (xAB ,x
B
B ,yB) given (x
A
A,x
B
A ,yA)
(32)
where Dui(xi, y) stands for (uix(xi, y), uiy(xi, y)), for all i = A,B. Note that, by the
Theorem of the Maximum,
arg max
0≤xA,xB ,y
uA(xA, y)
DuB(xB ,y)
 
xB−eB
y
!
≥0
uB(xB ,y)≥δBuB(xBB ,yB)
xA+xB+My=eA+eB
given (xAB ,x
B
B ,yB)
(33)
is a compact-valued, upper hemicontinuous correspondence that depends explicitly
on xBB , yB , and δB but also trivially on xAB and xAA, xBA , yA, δA.10 And similarly
for agent B’s problem. Therefore, Φ is the cartesian product of compact-valued,
10Since uA depends continuously on xA, y and also trivially on xAA, x
B
A , yA, x
A
B , x
B
B , yB , δ
A, δB , and
the correspondence defined by the constraints
ΩA(xAA, x
B
A , yA, x
A
B , x
B
B , yB , δ
A, δB) =
n
(xA, xB , y) ∈ R2n+m |DuB(xB , y)
„
xB−eB
y
«
≥ 0
uB(xB , y) ≥ δBuB(xBB , yB)
xA + xB +My = eA + eB
o
is continuous and compact-valued.
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upper hemicontinuous correspondences, and hence it is compact-valued and upper
hemicontinuous itself.11
Consider the correspondence Γ of fixed points of Φ as a function of δA, δB , i.e.
Γ(δA, δB) =
￿
(xAA, x
B
A , yA, x
A
B , x
B
B , yB) ∈ R2(2n+m) |
(xAA, x
B
A , yA, x
A
B , x
B
B , yB) ∈ Φ(xAA, xBA , yA, xAB , xBB , yB ; δA, δB)
￿
.
(34)
Since Φ is compact-valued and upper hemicontinuous, then the correspondence
mapping the fixed points of Φ(·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, δA, δB) to each pair (δA, δB) is upper hemi-
continuous.12
Finally, note that Γ is the correspondence of SSP equilibrium allocations (with-
out delay). Since this correspondence is upper hemicontinuous, in particular at
(δA, δB) = (1, 1) and, according to Theorem 1, Γ(1, 1) is the set of Lindahl alloca-
tions, then the claim follows.
Q.E.D.
7. Final remarks
In this paper we consider the collective decision problem faced by two agents who
must agree on the output level and financing of public goods, and we show how
bargaining over tax schedules can provide a foundation for Lindahl equilibrium
allocations. We think that this result provides new insights into the long standing
problem of finding strategic foundations for the Lindahl equilibrium. In particular,
it addresses the criticism that in the presence of personalized Lindahl prices agents
cannot be price-takers, by explicitly letting the agents oﬀer prices.
We limit the analysis to the two-agent, complete information case. We think that
this case captures the essentials of the actual bargaining taking place in legislatures
over the funding of public goods. Examples of interesting and important instances
11See Lemma A1 in Da´vila and Eeckhout (2008).
12See Lemma A3 in Da´vila and Eeckhout (2008).
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of two-party bargaining are negotiations in legislatures between government and op-
position, between territorial entities in federal countries, or in bilateral international
agreements.
A natural question is how to extend our bargaining game to a situation with more
agents, as in the models considered by Harrington (1989), Baron and Ferejohn
(1989), Banks and Duggan (2000), et al. Consider an n ≥ 3 person society in
which the agents alternate in the role of proposer in a fixed order. A proposal
consists as in this paper of a price vector and a quota, and each agent other than
the proposer sequentially decides whether to accept or not the proposal and in case
of acceptance chooses a maximum acceptable level of public goods. We conjecture
that a characterization of allocations corresponding to SSP equilibria without delay
analogous to that given by equations (6) and (7) can be obtained in this setting, so
that Theorems 1 and 2 still hold. We leave this question open for future research.
Appendix
Lemma 1. If (x, y) solves
maxu(x, y)
p · (x− e, y) ≤ 0
￿(x− e, y)￿ ≤ q,
(A.1)
where ￿ · ￿ stands for the Euclidean norm, then
Du(x, y)
￿
x− e
y
￿
≥ 0, (A.2)
and conversely, if x satisfies (A.2), then there exist p, q for which x solves (A.1).
Proof. Assume q > 0, otherwise (A.2) is trivially satisfied. Since x solves (A.1),
then there exist λ, µ ≥ 0 such that
Du(x, y) = λp+ µ(x− e, y)
λp(x− e, y) = 0
µ[(x− e)t(x− e) + yty − q2] = 0.
(A.3)
Therefore,
Du(x, y)(x− e, y) = λp(x− e, y) + µ(x− e, y)(x− e, y)|
= µ(x− e, y)(x− e, y) ≥ 0. (A.4)
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Conversely, if x, y satisfies Du(x, y)(x− e, y) = 0, let
λ = 1
µ = 0
p = Du(x, y)
q2 = (x− e, y)(x− e, y).
(A.5)
If x, y satisfies Du(x, y)(x− e, y) > 0, let
λ > 0
µ =
Du(x, y)(x− e, y)
(x− e, y)(x− e, y)
p =
1
λ
￿
Du(x, y)− Du(x, y)(x− e, y)
(x− e, y)(x− e, y) (x− e, y)
￿ ≥ 0
q2 = (x− e, y)(x− e, y),
(A.6)
where the weak inequality follows from the fact that if a ∈ Rn++ and b /∈ Rn+ are
such that ab > 0, then13
a− a · b
b · b b ≥ 0.
Q.E.D.
13See Lemma A2 in Da´vila and Eeckhout (2008).
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